Bank off-balance-sheet leverage: Some lessons to be learned from the financial crisis by Papanikolaou, N.I.
Leverage is one of the main underlying features of banks’ balance
sheets. Traditionally, leverage arises directly through the use of
deposited funds or other  balance- sheet items, such as bonds and
credit lines, as a supplementary tool of banks’ equity capital in
financing fresh loans and investments. However, leverage can also
be traced off the balance sheet of banking organisations. More specif-
ically, in the years before the outbreak of the late 2000s crisis, banking
firms took advantage of financial engineering that allowed them to
transfer a large part of their leverage off their balance sheets.
This chapter will examine how modern banking and the related
 off- balance- sheet leverage activities have affected the individual
soundness of US banks, as well as the systemic health of the US
banking industry, both before and after the onset of the 2007–08
financial crisis. To help achieve this, we will capture  off- balance-
 sheet leverage with different, yet complementary, measures, and
also empirically assess the impact of these measures on the overall
 risk- taking behaviour of US banks and on systemic risk. The details
of the empirical analysis can be found in a complementary study
(Papanikolaou and Wolff, 2013), which more technically oriented
readers can explore.1
OFF- BALANCE- SHEET LEVERAGE
In the years running up to the crisis – that is, from the late 1990s
onwards – banks were capable of transferring a part of their leverage
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and the accompanying risk off their balance sheets, mainly through
their engagement in securitisation activities and  over- the- counter
(OTC) derivatives trading. Both those undertakings were strongly
linked to what became known as “regulatory arbitrage”. This sort of
arbitrage concerned the response of banks to the restrictions
imposed on their operations by Basel I and II and, especially, those
imposed on banks’ equity capital. More concretely, regulatory arbi-
trage was the game that took place for more than two decades
between commercial banking firms and the regulatory authorities in
advanced market economies, where the former were innovating and
developing new financial instruments to help elude the scrutiny of
supervisors and increase their returns, while the latter were tight-
ening the rules in order to avoid excessive risk taking and safeguard
the stability of the financial system.
Securitisation was mainly achieved through the setting up of
 asset- backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits and structured
investment vehicles (SIVs) where banks could transfer significant
portions of their assets. More specifically, a large amount of bank
assets was transferred to the  above- mentioned investment pools,
whereas, at the same time, the sponsoring banks were providing
these pools with liquidity and credit enhancements in order to
ensure funding liquidity for them. These enhancements – widely
known as backstops – could attract a low charge under the Basel
agreements and were funded mostly by  short- term, securitised debt
and only by very little equity capital, or any other  long- term invest-
ments. In so doing, the sponsoring institutions were able to free up
capital and, at the same time, federal assets in the  so- called shadow
banking system.2 This permitted banks to originate new assets and,
more generally, to finance their activities without having to issue
new equity capital.3 As a result, conduits and SIVs contained a signif-
icant degree of bank leverage and risk in an implicit form that was
achieved through the structuring of the financial instruments per se.
Nonetheless, under the aforementioned business scheme of funding
(which had come to be known as the  “originate- to- distribute
model”), investors in conduits and SIVs would return the assets back
to the originating banks once they suffered a loss; indeed, banks
were legally obliged to take bad assets back on their books. That is to
say, asset risk was still burdening the sponsoring institutions.
Derivative products, on the other hand, evolved as part of the
MANAGING SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE
2
11 Chapter SIFI_SIFI RIsk  12/06/2013  11:46  Page 2
effort to better manage investment risks among international market
participants. Specifically, derivatives trading facilitated capital flows
worldwide by unbundling, and then more efficiently reallocating,
the various sources of risk that were associated with traditional
banking products such as bank loans, bonds and securities. Hence,
the financial innovation of introducing derivatives to capital markets
allowed the rather traditional arrangements of risk to be redesigned
in order to meet the desired risk profiles of the issuers and holders of
these instruments. Put differently, through the use of derivatives, a
part of risk could be taken away from those investors who were not
willing to carry it and moved towards those who were more willing
and (probably) more able to bear it.
While the  risk- shifting function of derivatives can play the useful
role of hedging and thereby facilitating capital flows, derivatives can
– at the same time – create new risks for the health of banking institu-
tions and the soundness of the financial system. The extensive use of
derivative contracts is likely to lead to a lower degree of trans-
parency between counterparties as well as between regulators and
market investors, which could potentially harm the stability of the
system. Furthermore, the embedded leverage in derivatives reduces
the amount of capital that acts as a cushion to market turmoil, raises
the risk of bank failure and heightens doubts about the soundness of
the entire sector.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: THE DATASET
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset that consists of 19 US
banking holding companies (BHCs) – see Table 11.1. The sample
institutions have been selected primarily on the basis of their
systemic importance for the US economy and the degree of their  off-
 balance- sheet exposure as documented in the bank derivatives
reports of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the
US Department of the Treasury.
The examined institutions are included in the top 50 BHCs’ list of
the National Information Center of the Federal Reserve System, and
all belong to the category of systemically important financial institu-
tions (SIFIs). This is to say, the US authorities would be reluctant to
let any of them go bankrupt as this would have a shattering effect on
the whole financial system. Indeed, not a single entity among those
that failed from the beginning of the crisis in mid-2007 is included in
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our dataset. On the contrary, almost all our banks (except Metlife Inc,
RBS Citizens Financial Group Inc, and Unionbancal Corp) have
received huge financial assistance from the US government through
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).4 Apparently our sample
banks provide the bulk of financing to the industry and households
in the US and elsewhere – meaning that, if any of them were allowed
to fail, this would inevitably cause serious systemic liquidity short-
ages in the economy.
It does not come as a surprise that the banks comprising our
dataset have been engaged in  non- traditional banking activities to a
much greater extent than their smaller counterparts. Actually, acad-
emic banking literature (see, for example, Rime and Stiroh, 2003) has
shown that large, systemic banks are very prone to  so- called
“universal activities” as compared to small- and  mid- sized institu-
tions, which are less diversified and resemble  single- line businesses.
Our sample banks have indeed been involved in a broad range of
activities other than pure commercial banking activities such as loan
granting and deposit taking. These activities were explicitly defined
by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 in the US and included –
among several others – securities dealing and underwriting, insur-
ance underwriting, financial and investment advisory services,
merchant banking and issuing or selling securitised interests in
 bank- eligible assets.
We believe it is important to justify at this point why we have
focused our analysis on the US banking sector and not on some other
advanced banking market. First and foremost, the crisis originated in
the US before spilling over into other economies around the globe.
MANAGING SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE
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Table 11.1 Sample of banks
Bank name Bank name
1. Bank of America Corp 11. Metlife Inc
2. BB&T Corp 12. Northern Trust Corp
3. Citigroup Inc 13. PNC Financial Services Group Inc
4. City National Corp 14. RBS Citizens Financial Group Inc
5. Comerica Inc 15. State Street Corp
6. Fifth Third Bankcorp 16. Suntrust Banks Inc
7. First Horizon National Corp 17. Unionbancal Corp
8. Huntington Bankshares Inc 18. US Bank Corp
9. JP Morgan Chase & Co 19. Zions Bankcorp
10. Keycorp
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Hence, by looking at the US banking industry, we are capable of better
tracing some of the root causes of the financial turmoil. Second, differ-
ences in accounting regimes can lead to large variations in the
 off- balance- sheet leverage behaviour of banks, which lie at the centre
of the present analysis. Evidently, Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) allowed US commercial banks to treat their SIVs
and ABCP conduits as being entirely off their balance sheets. In
contrast, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that
European banking institutions follow are somewhat less tolerant
toward  off- balance- sheet business as they require banks to keep a
record of these sort of items not off but on their balance sheets. Along
the same lines, the use of IFRS results in significantly higher amounts
of total assets and hence lower leverage ratios for the same or similar
exposures than does the use of US GAAP. The reason for this is the
netting of OTC derivatives, which is allowed under the former
reporting systems. More concretely, the netting conditions are stricter
under IFRS in that the gross replacement value of derivatives is gener-
ally shown on the balance sheet, even when positions are held under
master netting agreements with the same counterparty.
As an example, we can examine Deutsche Bank’s balance sheet
that is reported under both accounting principles. In 2009, the
systemically important German bank reported an amount of total
assets of €1.5 trillion under IFRS standards, where total assets were
equal to €0.9 trillion if US GAAP had been applied. Given that the
reported equity capital is (more or less) the same under both
accounting principles, the  on- balance- sheet leverage ratio for
Deutsche Bank in 2009 was much higher in IFRS values. Of course,
this has also been the case for every other accounting year.
From what we have seen above, GAAP provided US banks with
more incentives to undertake a higher degree of intangible leverage
compared to their European counterparts. Accordingly, our
emphasis on US institutions allows us to develop more solid
measures for their  off- balance- sheet leverage activities and the corre-
sponding leverage ratios, and then empirically test the effects of
these activities on banks’ soundness and on the system’s health,
which are the main issues examined in this chapter.
The data we employ in our empirical analysis are of quarterly
frequency and cover the period Q1 2002 to Q3 2012. The whole data
period is divided into two  sub- periods: the earlier one (Q1 2002 to Q2
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2007) includes the years before the outbreak of the crisis – ie, before
August 2007 – when the difference between the interest rates on
interbank loans and the  short- term US government bills (the  so-
 called TED spread) widened to 150–200 basis points relative to a
historically stable range of 10–50 basis points.5 The  pre- crisis years
were characterised by stable financial conditions and strong
economic expansion. The second period extends from Q3 2007 to Q3
2012 and refers to the crisis period in which financial turbulence,
uncertainty, and distress prevailed in the economy.
We do not observe the years prior to 2002 for the following
reasons. First, the two international financial crises that erupted in
East Asia and in Russia at the end of the 1990s, together with the
 Long- Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis of 1998, had a desta-
bilising impact on the US banking system. Second, no considerable
regulatory or other similar reforms occurred in the US banking
market from 2002 onwards, meaning that the operation of banks
remained largely unaffected by exogenous factors throughout the
examined period. In fact, the legislative activity in the US that largely
influenced the functioning of the entire banking sector was the
already mentioned Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, which opened
up the local market and allowed commercial and investment banks,
securities firms and insurance companies to merge their activities. If
any additional reforms had taken place in the banking regulatory
environment after 2002, it would be very likely to have exerted an
impact on the leverage decisions of banks and hence biased our
results.6
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: THE MODEL
To empirically examine the impact of  off- balance- sheet leverage on
individual bank health and on systemic risk, we use the following
pooled time series model:
                      
where:   i = 1, 2 …, N = 19; q = Q1 2002, Q2 2002, …, Q3 2012
k = the number of leverage variables
m = the number of control variables
In this model: Yiq stands for either individual bank risk, or systemic
risk; the vector ∆leviq,k includes the average quarterly changes in the
Yiq =! iq + "k!leviq ,k" + #mxiq ,m +" $ iq
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different types of  off- balance- sheet leverage business of banks; xiq,m
represents the vector of  bank- specific and macroeconomic control
variables; eiq is the regression error term, whereas the vectors a, b and
g contain the parameters of interest to be estimated. The reason we
include the  off- balance- sheet leverage variables expressed in differ-
ences rather than levels is because we want to capture the effects of
increasing and declining leverage trends on the dependent variables
of our model.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: THE VARIABLES
In this section, we will describe the variables included in the regres-
sion analysis, which are reported in detail in Papanikolaou and
Wolff (2013). Starting with the  left- hand side variables of the model,
we capture systemic risk by using the marginal expected shortfall
(MES) as proposed by Acharya et al (2012). MES describes how the
total risk exposure of an individual bank adds to the banking
system’s overall risk level. The intuition behind this measure of
systemic risk is that a financial firm cannot continue its operation in
case the value of its equity capital falls below some fraction of its
outstanding liabilities. Such a capital shortage can be potentially
harmful for the entire banking market and may, in turn, have reper-
cussions throughout the financial and real sectors – depending on
the systemic importance of the troubled institution. Accordingly, a
banking firm is viewed as being systemically risky if it is likely to
face a large capital shortfall just when the entire financial sector itself
is under distress. In sum, MES provides us with the expected capital
loss of a bank when the overall market declines by some specific
amount over a given period of time. In practice, we first pick up the
5% worst days for an equally weighted portfolio of CDS returns on
the 19 banks of our sample in every quarter of a year, and then
compute the CDS returns for any given sample bank for these partic-
ular days.
MES relies upon two different, yet interrelated, measures of risk
that are commonly used by managers to calculate the risk exposure
of their firms: the expected shortfall (ES) and the  value- at- risk (VaR).
ES provides us with the anticipated loss of a financial institution
conditional on the loss being larger than VaR, where VaR measures
the potential loss in the value of a risky asset (or portfolio of assets)
over a predetermined time period for a given confidence interval. In
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fact, VaR is a widely used tool for volatility measurement that
answers the question, “What is the largest amount of money that an
individual, or an institution can lose in really bad times, or due to
some extreme event of financial distress?” For instance, if the VaR on
an asset is equal to €1 million at a  one- week, 99% confidence level,
there is a just a 1% chance that the value of the asset will drop more
than €1 million over any other given week.
The other metric of risk we employ in our analysis is the total bank
risk (TOTRISK). This measures the individual bank fragility and is
calculated as the quarterly standard deviation of each sample bank’s
daily stock market returns. In particular, we first take the weekly
 (Friday- to- Friday) returns for each individual bank using its daily
stock market prices obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
TOTRISK is then calculated as the empirical standard deviation of
those returns. This is to say, TOTRISK captures the total volatility of
equity prices for each individual bank. It incorporates credit risk,
market risk and liquidity risk in a single measure.
The behaviour of the two risk variables of our model is presented
in Figures 11.1 and 11.2. It is clear from Figure 11.1 that the average
MES grows continuously over the entire data period. This implies
that the massive deleveraging process which was triggered by the
outbreak of the crisis in  mid- to- late-2007, and which took place off
the balance sheet of banks (as we will later discuss), did not interrupt
the increasing course of systemic risk. On the other hand, TOTRISK
is found to follow an increasing trend only before the crisis hit the
financial system (see Figure 11.2). Deleveraging, in this case, bene-
fited banks in terms of reducing their overall risk taking and
improving their risk profile.
Turning to the  right- hand- side variables of the regression model,
we employ several different measures of banks’  off- balance- sheet
leverage that are complementary to each other. To develop these
measures, we use data mainly from the FR Y-9C reports, filed quar-
terly by BHCs with the Federal Reserve. These reports contain
consolidated  balance- sheet and income statement data for US BHCs.
We also collect data from the OCC’s “Quarterly Reports on Bank
Derivatives Activities”.
We capture derivatives leverage by using the  on- balance- sheet
asset equivalent component of the exposure implied by the  off-
 balance- sheet derivatives contracts. This measure is calculated by the
MANAGING SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE
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ratio of credit equivalent amount of OTC derivatives outstanding to
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (DERLEV) and maps the  off- balance- sheet
derivatives positions onto their  on- balance- sheet equivalents. The
credit equivalent risk of a derivatives instrument essentially consists
of two basic elements: the current exposure, which refers to the
 mark- to- market value of the instrument; and the potential exposure,
which is a statistically determined potential loss arising from likely
variations of the value of the instrument in its remaining life.
In addition to the derivatives activity of banks, we also measure
asset securitisation through conduits and other special vehicles. As
discussed earlier, financial engineering allowed banks to securitise
loans and other assets and sell them to the secondary markets. The
originating banks, however, retained the servicing rights to the
bundle of securitised loans. We thus report the outstanding principal
amount of loans and other assets sold and securitised with servicing
BANK OFF-BALANCE-SHEET LEVERAGE: SOME LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
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Figure 11.1  Average marginal expected shortfall
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Figure 11.2  Average total risk
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retained or with recourse or any other credit backstops provided
divided by total assets (SECLEV) to capture the magnitude of banks’
 off- balance- sheet leverage due to asset securitisation activity.
Moreover, we employ a version of the  off- balance- sheet leverage
ratio (OBSLEV) proposed by the Bank for International Settlements
(BCBS, 2009) in our model. The numerator of OBSLEV is given by the
sum of commitments, direct credit substitutes, letters of credit and
guarantees, acceptances and repos, where the denominator is the
book equity capital. OBSLEV is very similar to the  off- balance- sheet
ratio used by the Bank of Canada. The main difference between the
two ratios is the value of transaction- and  trade- related contingencies
that are both added in the numerator of the Canadian Bank’s
leverage ratio, but not in our ratio due to the lack of the relevant data.
Crucially, the derivatives contracts and securitised assets that are
captured in DERLEV and SECLEV, respectively, are not considered
in the OBSLEV ratio. This is to say, the three  off- balance- sheet
leverage variables that we include in our analysis have a comple-
mentary role to each other.
In Figures 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5, we can see that all kinds of  off-
 balance- sheet leverage activities have been significantly increased
during the  pre- crisis period. In contrast, a rather sharp downward
trend in all such sort of activities is reported in the crisis period.
Apparently, the US SIFIs accumulated a high degree of leverage off
their balance sheets during the economic upturn, whereas they
largely reduced their  off- balance- sheet holdings after the eruption of
the crisis. For instance, the average SECLEV increased from 0.03 in
MANAGING SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE
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Figure 11.3  Average derivatives leverage
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Q1 2002 to more than 0.19 in Q4 2008; it was afterwards reduced to
almost half, reaching the level of 0.10 in Q3 2012 (see Figure 11.4).
It is widely accepted that economic performance has a consider-
able effect on the demand and supply of banking services. More
precisely, high levels of banking activity are generally related to
favourable economic conditions. We thus employ the quarterly
change in the US Consumer Price Index (INF) to control for varia-
tions in the level of prices, and the GDP output gap (GDP) to control
for changes in economic growth. Inflation data are obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics of the US Department of Labor, whereas
GDP data are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US
Department of Commerce.
Table 11.2 presents all the main variables that we use in the econo-
metric analysis. The abbreviation of each variable and the source we
use to collect the data are also reported.
BANK OFF-BALANCE-SHEET LEVERAGE: SOME LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
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Figure 11.4  Average securitisation leverage
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Figure 11.5  Average off-balance-sheet leverage ratio
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PRE- CRISIS PERIOD FINDINGS
According to our empirical findings, and consistently with the
descriptive charts presented earlier, the increase in the  off- balance-
 sheet leverage activities of banks led to higher MES and higher
TOTRISK in the years before the onset of the crisis. This can be
explained as follows. Since the early 2000s, banks have responded to
the augmented demand for credit instruments with higher yield by
developing financial engineering techniques and creating modern
types of products such as credit derivatives, credit default swaps,
collateralised debt obligations and securitised loans. Although these
developments may have come about as a result of wider financial
advances aimed at improving the efficiency of the system, they also
provided opportunities for increasing banks’  off- balance- sheet
leverage and for shifting risks among market participants in highly
complicated ways. Most of the (then) new financial instruments were
indeed opaque and masked the extent of leverage and interconnect-
edness of risk, which appeared to  spill- over across a wide range of
institutions and markets worldwide.
On the whole, the involvement of SIFIs in the  off- balance- sheet
leverage business during the  pre- crisis period increased both
individual bank risk and systemic risk, as revealed by the posi-
tive relationship we document between the leverage and the risk
variables.
This is to say that the mixture of different  off- balance- sheet
leverage activities played a harmful role for both the health of indi-
vidual banks and the stability of the entire system. The expansion of
derivatives leverage associated with increased securitisation busi-
ness as well as other  off- balance- sheet activities weakened the health
of individual banks, generating – at the same time – substantial insta-
bility in the system.
CRISIS PERIOD FINDINGS
The shrink of leverage, known as “reverse leverage” or “delever-
aging”, refers to the phenomenon in which financial intermediaries
all attempt to shrink their balance sheets together by selling part of
their assets or by reducing their debt with the aim of returning to a
safe level of capital. However, deleveraging may also concern the
 off- balance- sheet exposure of banking organisations. Indeed, during
the crisis period, the  off- balance- sheet holdings of the US systemic
MANAGING SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE
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banks were largely reduced (as was shown in the relevant summary
statistics, see Figures 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5).
We find that the deleveraging process which occurred off the
balance sheets of banks have worsened the systemic risk profile of
the US banking system. This can be explained in the following way:
shortly after the crisis erupted, US financial organisations sought to
deleverage both their on- and  off- balance- sheet positions, thus
amplifying the already existing downward pressure on asset prices.
As a result, the collateral values of assets held by banks deteriorated,
making it difficult for them to raise fresh funds from the markets.
Banks were therefore forced to further decrease their overall leverage
exposure, thus encouraging the deleveraging spiral even further.
This procyclical process was exacerbated by the large size and the
systemic importance of the financial institutions that were engaged
in all sorts of  off- balance- sheet activities.
When a significant number of banks attempt to deleverage their
positions with the aim of strengthening their leverage ratios, various
destabilising factors can be set in motion. If, for instance, several
systemic financial institutions sell part of their assets at the same
time, the market prices of these assets will almost immediately fall,
especially if the selling assets are of the same class (mortgage loans,
housing assets, etc). Asset prices will then decline to the point where
the sale proceeds will not retire enough debt to improve leverage
ratios. In fact, ratios may actually deteriorate. Banks will, in turn,
hold off selling as long as possible and the market will freeze up. As
a consequence, a large volume of  hard- to- value assets carried by
highly leveraged institutions looms over the markets.
Overall, any serious fall in asset prices, or any large losses in loans
or securities, or any cut in cashflows, can exert reverse leverage
effects on the system, and especially in a system that consists of
highly leveraged institutions. Arguably, the deleveraging process
puts additional downward pressure on the entire system, even
although it might be beneficial for the health of banking organisa-
tions on an individual basis.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
In this chapter, we have examined how modern banking that gave
birth to the  off- balance- sheet leverage activities affected the overall
risk profile of US systemic banks as well as the level of systemic risk
MANAGING SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE
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before and after the financial crisis which erupted in mid-2007. We
employed a very representative pooled time series dataset of US
SIFIs that covered both the  pre- crisis period as well as that after mid-
2007, and modelled the relationship between bank soundness and
systemic fragility with several complementary  off- balance- sheet
measures of bank leverage.
Our formal evidence reliably indicates that  off- balance- sheet
leverage largely contributes to both total bank risk and systemic risk,
thus corroborating the findings that appear in the relevant academic
literature (see, for example, Wu et al, 2011) as well as in the popular
financial press. More concretely, we lend support to the view that,
before the onset of the crisis, banks accumulated leverage both on
and (especially) off their balance sheets. Indeed, banks were able to
expand leverage in ways that were previously impossible: by largely
relying on new financial products, they managed to extend the  short-
 term funding of their medium- and  long- term assets. This increased
maturity mismatch and raised the probability of bank runs – and, in
turn, the levels of individual bank risk and of systemic risk, thus
forcing the system to either fail or consider  large- scale bailouts.
Accordingly, in the  pre- crisis era, the positive relationship that we
document between the increasing  off- balance- sheet leverage activi-
ties and risk shows that leverage was one of the main factors
responsible for the fragility of the financial system. Nevertheless, a
much more tangible threat to systemic stability was formed after the
beginning of the crisis when banks started to dispose of the large
number of bad assets they held either in their portfolio or out of it.
The deleveraging process, which took place off the balance sheet of
banks, is found to be beneficial for individual banks’ health, but very
harmful for the stability of the system.
The obtained empirical results indicate that bank managers need
to closely monitor both the degree of risk taking of their institutions
(by measuring TOTRISK, for example) and of systemic risk (using
MES), and, at the same time, avoid putting such a heavy weight on
the estimates of the earnings per share. Put more generally, it is
crucial for managers to carefully look at different measures of bank
performance from a microperspective view (profitability measures,
risk measures, etc), while also paying special attention to the
broader, macroprudential aspects of systemic stability.
In a similar vein, risk managers are expected to act more
BANK OFF-BALANCE-SHEET LEVERAGE: SOME LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
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prudently and keep an eye on the level of their  off- balance- sheet
leverage exposure, and also think of setting some specific internal
limits to this sort of activities if needed. These kinds of limits should
be complementary to the various microprudential and macropru-
dential restrictions imposed by bank regulators. The leverage ratio
under Basel III, for instance, takes into account the  off- balance- sheet
items that will be – most likely – converted using a flat 100% credit
conversion factor. Of course, for bank managers to act in a prudent
manner, a  risk- based remuneration framework needs to be estab-
lished under Basel III to prevent them from excessive risk taking.
1 See Papanikolaou and Wolff (2013).
2 Shadow banking consisted of  non- bank financial institutions such as hedge funds, insur-
ance funds, investment funds, pension funds, SIVs and conduits (the most important ones).
Some of these institutions, including SIVs and conduits, disappeared when the crisis
erupted along with several markets where modern financial instruments were traded.
3 Banks were very keen on engaging in securitised activities not only because they could
qualify for lower capital requirements, but also because securitisation had the additional
advantage of generating fee income. Since fees did not have to be returned if securities
suffered any losses, banks were furnished with an additional incentive to structure products
and leverage their positions even further.
4 In late 2008, the US government enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA),
which authorised the Treasury Department to establish TARP and to spend up to US$700
billion in stabilising the financial system.
5 The acronym TED has been formed from  T- bill in combination with ED, which is the ticker
symbol for the Eurodollar futures contract.
6 It is well established in the banking literature that regulation strongly affects industry struc-
ture, and alters the behaviour of banks in terms of performance and risk taking (see, for
example, Brissimis et al, 2008).
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